The Mother of all Losses and Saddam Hussein

A saying on the trading floor: if you can’t take a small loss, sooner or later you will take the mother of all losses. What does it mean? Well, one way it’s explained to us—by the great market philosopher Jack D. Schwager in his eponymous work The New Market Wizards—is through the lens of Gulf War history. Anyone remember Saddam Hussein? And his invasion of Kuwait? In the years leading up to the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein’s actions were eerily similar to those of a novice trader.

Let’s take a look.

Hussein wanted to invade the small, neighboring country of Kuwait. Initially, he had solid reasons for doing this: he could drive up oil prices to his own country’s benefit. Iraq was consistently being hurt by Kuwait, because Kuwait exceeded its OPEC quota at every turn. Hussein thought his chances were good in permanently annexing all or part of Kuwait’s oil fields, and gaining direct access to the Persian Gulf. Also, and we can debate this, Hussein was a proven, competent leader. At least in his own eyes. He was a strongman in his party, the Arab Socialists (Baathists), from 1968 to 1979; then he became President of Iraq in 1979 and was still President over a decade later. After so many years in power, he craved what we all crave. More.

The initial risk on the trade was capped. This is hard to believe now—but there was a time when the U.S. Military was not addicted to fast trigger, incessant intervention in the Middle East. We had not yet formed the habit of sacking their political leaders, chasing them from their homes and exploding them in drainage pipes— so Saddam Hussein’s instinct that he could invade Kuwait and get away with it was not wrong. In 1990, when Hussein first telegraphed his threat to invade Kuwait, the United States was deeply apathetic. The State Department gave out a big shrug. Across the corridors of power in Washington, D.C., there was a motto: “It ain’t our problem.” So again, from Hussein’s perspective: the trade had a nice Sharpe ratio. He could capture a small country with endless oil reserves, enjoy all the economic upside, and the risk was quantifiably small that anyone cared enough to stop him.

Then attitudes changed.

President George Bush (elder) committed troops to the defence of Saudi Arabia, spearheading UN resolutions aimed at convincing Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. Hussein was given time and opportunity to negotiate a deal in which to withdraw in exchange for disputed territory or port access. At this juncture, he could have closed out the trade for a quick profit. He dug in. He committed himself further even after it was clear the international community was against him. As a random sidenote, something interesting to think about—if Saddam Hussein had invaded Kuwait when there wasn’t a President from Texas in office, when, say, the U.S. President’s entire campaign (and family coffers) weren’t tied to petrochemicals and men who make their living pumping, drilling, and refining— if Saddam Hussein hadn’t coincided his invasion with the U.S. President who had intense feelings on this subject—he may have had more success. But as it turned out, Bush cared a lot about the topic of who owns what oil. The 41st President made that clear by doubling U.S. forces, sending four hundred thousand troops to the Middle East. Bush would take back Kuwait by force, and he would do it without restraint. And again, Hussein had a chance to change his mind. Again, he dug in.

The famous January 15 deadline for Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait was sent down from the mountain; Hussein ignored the command. The date came and went. The United States and its allies began the massive bombing attack of Iraq, and Hussein watched—and he must have seen—because there was no way not to see it—the upside on his decision slice in half. As the cities in Iraq became blast zones, as more buildings were exploded, more infrastructure demolished, as economic costs mounted (leave the humanitarian costs aside for a moment), Hussein must have seen that whatever gain he made in Kuwait would be outstripped by losses at home, in Iraq.

But he didn’t see that. Or if he saw it, it didn’t inform his actions. Because novice traders have a tendency. Novice traders, always, and reliably, can be counted on to get caught in a deteriorating position and fixate on one thing: how much has been lost already and what chance there is the loss can be erased. This phenomenon has been studied by everyone from Daniel Kahneman to Warren Buffett, and yet, no matter how much is written on the topic, it never fails to inspire wonder. The sunk cost fallacy slash long shot fantasy catches all of us—and it caught Saddam Hussein. He had come this far; he had risked (and lost) plenty, so he might as well go further. “Hussein pinned his hopes on the long shot: If only he held on long enough, perhaps fear of casualties would prompt the United States to back down.”

The United States didn’t back down.

When the ground war against Iraq began, Hussein actually considered the Soviet peace proposal. Still, Hussein didn’t like the language/conditions of the peace proposal. He didn’t think there was enough benefit for the people of Iraq (which is funny, because at the time bombs were dropping onto rooftops). At this point, he must have told himself, “I’ll get out when I’m even on this trade”, which is another mistake the novice trader makes. We’re not in Kansas anymore. There is a new market structure in place. Each time the market puts in a high, it’s lower relative to the last high. Lower relative highs. There were U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq, razing the place to dust, and Hussein was still procrastinating on the decision to capitulate.

“Get me out of the market. I don’t care at what price, just get me out!”

The utterance that always comes last.

It’s the part in Tolstoy’s Death of Ivan Ilyich where Ilyich knows he’s been wrong about everything—about his life, about his choices—and he just wants out. He can’t bear to suffer the suffering; he can’t take another minute of living in his house with his wretched wife and ungrateful kids, his failing body and wrecked existence, and he just wants to die. He wants to get out of the market at any price. It’s that last human instinct: that all your instincts have been wrong. You could have lived differently but you didn’t, and it’s too late, it’s too painful, to think about it. That urge is so primal, the drive so powerful—get me out, get me out of this at any cost.

Hussein finally got there.

The mother of all losses looked like this. The Gulf War ended in a coalition victory declared on February 28, 1991. President Bush called a ceasefire. Hussein managed to remain in power for another decade plus, though the world loathed him. In 2003, he was overthrown. He stood trial for a relatively obscure infraction; the question brought before the Iraqi High Tribunal was whether Saddam Hussein, in 1982, had committed a crime against humanity by unfairly retaliating against 148 Shiite Muslims who tried to blow up his motorcade and assassinate him. Of course, it was a show trial, and the point was to sentence Hussein to execution, which by then, everyone wanted. Hussein probably wanted it too. He accepted his fate but made a final request. Since he had been commander-in-chief of Iraq, he preferred the lawful military capital punishment of death by firing squad. Instead of going to the gallows, could he instead stand with his back to a wall and be shot? The court denied his request. Justice would be served with a noose. So it was on December 30, 2006, Hussein ate his last meal on earth: chicken and rice with a cup of hot water and honey. Then a contingent of his countrymen, the ones he ruled for forty years, jeered at him; they shouted at him in Arabic as the hangman’s noose went over his head and the trap door opened.

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Tolstoy and his theory about "Great Men"